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Beyond varieties of development: disputes and alternatives

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ABSTRACT
Many South–South cooperation programmes have promoted development without fully discussing the implications of that concept. To evaluate this situation, recent heterodox development strategies are examined, particularly those under progressivist governments in South America. It is found that development strategies are certainly plural, but they all share a common pre-political background. To address this feature, the concept of ‘varieties of development’ is introduced. Then a new typology on the disputes over development is presented. Three types are recognised (controversies within a specific variety of development; disputes among different varieties; and disputes on alternatives to all varieties of development). The concept of Buen Vivir is presented as an alternative to development, and disputes of the third type, that involve this concept, are examined. Paradoxically, as the current focus of South–South cooperation is to reinforce conventional varieties of development, it is blocking alternatives, even the Southern option of Buen Vivir.

The vast majority of current programmes in South–South cooperation (SSC) are, in one way or the other, linked to different understandings of development. Efforts in areas like multilateral cooperation, international aid, trade facilitation or investment allocation are always framed by ideas of development based on key concepts like progress, economic growth or welfare. SSC is not an exception, even in the cases in which it is presented as an alternative Southern perspective on traditional programmes of industrialised countries (the North) with ‘underdeveloped’ nations (the South). This is clear in the UN Office for South–South Cooperation definition, which states that SSC is the sharing of knowledge, skills, expertise and resources among ‘developing’ countries to meet their ‘development goals’ through concerted efforts.1

While SSC maintains itself within these broad objectives, at the same time significant changes in the understanding of development are underway, particularly in Latin America, changes which are not always recognized in the global North.

In the light of this situation my objectives in this paper are twofold. First, I will briefly comment on the limited analysis of the implicit ideas of the concept of ‘development’ in SSC, particularly addressing recent South American strategies based on extractivism. I will present the concept of ‘varieties of development’ in order, on the one hand, to recognise that there...
are different expressions – ranging from that of liberal capitalism to the South American neo-developmentalism run by progressivist governments to Chinese state capitalism – and, on the other hand, to highlight that they all share the same basic components. I present a new typology of the different disputes on development, and have selected the South American concept of *Buen Vivir* as the most important effort among alternatives to development. This concept is briefly described. It will be found that current SSC in development is functional at strengthening the core components of development, while paradoxically weakening a truly southern alternative, ie *Buen Vivir*.

Second, as this debate has been mostly in Latin America, in Spanish and Portuguese, and within the realm of social movements, think-tanks and NGOs, rather than in the academy, it is important to present some of its features in English.

**Big experiments in development: Latin America neo-developmentalism**

In most cases SSC still moves around conventional ideas of development, such as investment in transport infrastructure, sanitation services or agriculture productivity, conceived as necessary means of growth or welfare, with some innovations (such as support for new sectors, eg promotion of microelectronics). Usually the discussion is on how to promote development, which is conceived as economic growth, while there is little discussion on the meaning and implications of the category; the idea of development is taken for granted.

To address the issue of what is meant by development in the new SSC is an urgent matter, because there are quite a number of ‘big new experiments’ in development in the South. These include the strategies in several South American countries under the progressivists, or new left governments, and in China under the state and Communist Party administration.

In the case of South America the left turn started in 1999 with Hugo Chávez winning the national election in Venezuela. In the years that followed so-called progressivist administrations have included: Argentina (Frente por la Victoria, led by Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner); Bolivia (with the Movimiento al Socialismo led by Evo Morales); Brazil (Workers Party and allies with Lula da Silva); Ecuador (with the loose Alianza PAIS, led by Rafael Correa); and Uruguay (Tabaré Vázquez and José ‘Pepe’ Mujica of the Frente Amplio). Other attempts at a left turn were unsuccessful, for diverse reasons (as in the cases of Chile under the R. Lagos administration, Paraguay with the F. Lugo presidency and in Peru in the first months of the Ollanta Humala administration).

Early South American analysis divided these administrations into two main sets, one more radical, the other resembling European social democracy; similar distinctions continue up to this day. Nevertheless, it is more appropriate to recognise a much more diverse array of political processes. This being recognised, beyond this diversity, all these administrations (and their supporting political movements) state that they are part of the same set and share the self-identifying label of progressivists. (An example of this are the Encuentros Latino Americanos Progresistas, organised by the Ecuadorian government.)

Their development strategies are certainly heterodox, and have been labelled ‘neo-developentalism’ in Brazil; national and popular development in Argentina; Andean Amazonian communitarianism in Bolivia; 21st century socialism in Venezuela; and son on. These strategies reject market reductionism (usually presented as opposition to the so-called Washington Consensus), give a stronger role to the state to deal with the national economy and development, display resource nationalisms with different intensities, and sustain strong discourses
on social justice (although most programmes are based on different monetised compensations, such as conditional cash transfers).

There are many positive features in these strategies, such as the reduction of poverty, strengthening state control over natural resource extractivism, or more direct involvement of the grassroots. These and other features have been highlighted, particularly by academics and activists in industrialised countries, which is understandable when comparing these recent Latin American styles with their previous conservative or neoliberal administrations.

After the reflux of the left turn it is now clear that this South American progressivism is caught within the same core ideas of development. Several negative outcomes of these strategies are being intensively discussed, particularly among social movements. Neo-developmentalistism operates in strengthening a tripod of exports, investment and consumerism. These countries that have adopted it have taken advantage of the commodity price boom, with notable increases in both volume and value, but this was only possible thanks to an impressive expansion of the extraction of natural resources.

This has resulted in progressivist extractivism, which has repeated social and environmental impacts (particularly on indigenous and peasant communities), but also in a number of spill-over effects beyond the extractive sectors. These include, among others, the weakening of social and environmental regulations in order to attract investment, drastic territorial reshaping as a result of oil and mining concessions and expansion of agricultural lands, the curtailment of human and environmental rights as extractivism has displayed increased violence, and the narrowing of social justice to distributive economic programmes, and particularly economic compensation. Most countries deepened their traditional roles as raw material suppliers and are competing in their flexibility to attract foreign investment, resulting in more subordination to global markets and a reduction of national industries.

Consumerism has expanded notably, explaining in part the sense of welfare in many countries, while the marginal and poorest have been supported mainly by conditional cash transfer programmes. Those programmes could be very useful under emergency conditions or to reduce extreme poverty, but their impact on the quality of life is debatable. These instruments are more effective at reducing social unrest in urban settings, but are much more reduced in rural areas, particularly in the extractive enclaves. As extractivism increases within peasant and indigenous territories, grassroots opposition increases and conflicts escalate in intensity.

These spill-overs also promote a ‘compensatory’ state that intensively uses diverse types of compensation to overcome its tensions and reach equilibrium. These states are caught between promoting economic growth and regulating the market, accepting foreign investment requirements and responding to grassroots demands, inserting into global markets but questioning global capitalism. These and other factors operate in almost opposite directions, so the state, though inserted in global capitalism, mainly as supplier of raw materials, operates to reduce the negative effects mainly by compensation and via the market. Although these various states follow different paths and have diverse discourses, this results in deepening the commodification of both society and nature.

South American neo-developmentalistism has been applied under formally democratic regimes, but most governments have turned into to delegative democracies. That is to say, representation is reduced and the presidential role expands, as the president is the embodiment of the nation, reducing the roles of the legislative and judiciary branches, and weakening institutionalisation.
Another recent big experiment, the Chinese case, offers a similar picture. Although there is a long-standing debate on the nature of the Chinese development strategies, presented by some as a distinct model, I would like to emphasise that it shares the basic ideas of Western development. This includes key concepts such as growth and industrialisation, although these are carried out through a gradual dual track combining market liberalisation in some sectors and planning and state controls in others, as described by the influential Chinese economist Justin Yifu Lin, who was the first chief economist at the World Bank from a Southern country. Growth has a central role, so as to move from a rural-based society to an urban industrialised one. As in South America, recent anthropological surveys have found a drastic transformation of peasant rural communities under this state-communist capitalism, as the market invades everyday life.

Lin and Wang described development as climbing the ‘same mountain’ for any country, suggesting that the successful path of structural transformation pursued by China should be used in South–South cooperation, diffusing the ‘tacit’ knowledge on the ‘how to’ of development. In other words, China’s SSC endorses a revised but still similar myth of the stages of development, just like the strategies of the Western industrialised countries.

The analysis of these large-scale development experiments shows that there are differences among the South American and Chinese cases, and also within the South American strategies. Development is certainly plural, but all these expressions share the core components described above, such as to conceive development as economic growth, subordination to globalisation, and an emphasis on material consumption to achieve welfare, etc. Differences are important, and are not neglected here, but it is also important to acknowledge that we are facing a common background on development, a deeply rooted ‘pre-political’ posture.

Pre-political refers to earlier delimitations and assumptions that encompass modern contemporary political traditions (such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, etc). These include, for example, the ideas of what (who) is a political subject, which are the arenas for discussion, which are the legitimate questions, bearers of rights and duties, etc. This explains features such as the fact that, in all development strategies, political subjects are humans, and most notably experts, but non-humans are excluded, or that there are campaigns reclaiming the ‘right’ to development. These understandings could be interpreted as a cultural condition, but I consider that these features are rooted even deeper, as they include not only culture in its conventional meanings but also conceptions of nature, and of the possible (or impossible) interactions between society and the environment. Thus, these pre-political conditions are another way of expressing an ontological condition. Following this perspective all development varieties, whether conventional or alternative, are within the modern ontology. Furthermore, modernity should not be considered as the imposition of European culture since the Enlightenment, but as a more complex phenomenon shaping the world-system, produced in Europe but also in the colonies at the same time. ‘Development’ is one of the words we are using for the most recent stage of this global shaping.

South–South cooperation among the new developments

SSC within South America, as expressed in Mercosur (Common Market of the South, with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela), and within Unasur (Union of South American Nations at the continental scale), is limited and focused on conventional
assistance.\textsuperscript{17} Even as part of major continental efforts, like the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (in Spanish, IIRSA), SSC is reduced to coordination on projects and financing, and there is no discussion of the contents of development. Brazil’s idea of cooperation rests heavily on subsidising and financing its national corporations in projects and investment in other countries in Latin America.\textsuperscript{18} Even in the case of more radical efforts, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), led by Venezuela under the Chávez presidency, this form of cooperation has depended on high financial assistance during the oil price boom.

China’s cooperation with some South American countries also operates on traditional development postures. Among recent agreements major loans attached to preferential access to natural resources are noteworthy.\textsuperscript{19} These include loans for commodities like oil or agro-foods, with few environmental or social restrictions. This cooperation does not promote alternatives in development, but reinforces the traditional strategies of South American countries as commodity suppliers for global markets. SSC, even in the sense used by Lin and Wang,\textsuperscript{20} does not alter the core ideas of development, and is more traditional than is usually recognised, as the major change is a shift in trade and financial partners (eg China replacing the USA or the EU).

These examples show that in current practices SSC is more closely related to changes in power and representation in the global political arena, or to participation in flows of capital, goods and services among countries, but not to changes in the ideas of development.

**Varieties of development**

The idea of shared components that express something like the core or base of development was part of the early post-development critique (particularly by Escobar).\textsuperscript{21} That approach was criticised and in some cases rejected.\textsuperscript{22} Nevertheless, more recent evidence, and particularly large-scale development experiments like the current South American ones, shows that a core of basic components is emerging once again. Furthermore, civil society thinking and experiences have reached the same conclusion in recent years, in most cases independently from the post-development literature. This is very clear in Andean South America, where Bolivian and Ecuadorian progressivist governments promised radical alternatives to Western classical development, but ended by using in similar conventional strategies. As an example, from the point of view of an indigenous community dealing with pollution from oil drilling in Amazonia, there are few real differences whether the polluter is a private company with its headquarters located in Europe, a mixed private–state corporation (like the Brazilian Petrobras) or state-owned (like the Venezuelan PDVSA or the Bolivian YPFB).

Progressivist neo-developmentalism does of course have some new features, but the core concepts (and its sensitivity) are the same. Thus, the post development critique was correct in that sense, although it is also true that it presented a reductionist view, not fully recognising the heterogeneity among different development efforts. Development is always plural, but it is rooted in a basement with common ideas, concepts and sensitivities.

As a reaction to this situation, I propose to introduce the concept of ‘varieties of development’ to demonstrate that there are different plural expressions and arrangements of development, but all share the same roots in modernity. This proposal is inspired by work on the ‘varieties of capitalism.’\textsuperscript{23}
Well known ‘varieties’ include the sustainable, human, local, endogenous and other versions of development. Most of these resulted from processes that started with strong critiques of mainstream development, but ended as revised versions with instrumental changes, while protecting the basic core ideas, like growth. This was the case, for example, of the strong ecological critique of development as economic growth in the 1970s. That push was not able to end that myth, but produced the concept of sustainable development as framed by the Brundtland Report, in which growth was resurrected, although only to be achieved if nature, and social and technological limits, were managed. Following a similar trend the social critique of development, aiming to differentiate growth and development, resulted in human development as conceived by UNDP, which nevertheless maintained the economic components in a mixed index. More recent versions include those defined in South America today, such as neo-developmentalist in Brazil, the national and popular in Argentina, or the 21th century Bolivarian socialism (as discussed above).

These different varieties of development share some basic components, such as growth, progress, the commodification of society and nature, utilitarianism, dualism (nature and society as separate realms), and other features that are all part of modernity (in the sense described above).

Disputes on development

As there are varieties of development, we will have disputes over development, because some actors defend their own idea as the best, while accusing others of being wrong or incomplete. So this concept offers the possibility for a different classification of these controversies, which is compatible with a post-development critique (in the sense of a post-structuralist deconstruction). By ‘dispute’ I refer to debates, discussions or conflicts; the actors engaged range from government officials to grassroots activists to scholars to businessmen, and are expressed in the public realm.

Disputes on development can be divided into three types. Type I involves controversies on instrumental arrangements on development within a specific variety of development. Examples of this are discussions on the use of technologies or locations for industrial projects, different options for value chains in agro-foods, etc. Under this type, the dispute is about the concepts, processes and structures, but within a variety of development, which is usually considered positive. Many negotiations and debates in the international cooperation field correspond to this type, such as those related to technology assistance or policy transfers.

Type II refers to disputes among different varieties of development, in which one variety is defended as a better option than another. This includes, for example, those who consider that neo-Keynesian styles are better than neoliberal ones, or those who insist that sustainable development is preferable to economic development. Different varieties, such as local, human, sustainable, endogenous, etc are discussed and compared. But this type also includes disputed development varieties based on different political and ideological perspectives, such as classical Anglo-Saxon capitalism, the Latin American neo-developmentalist 21st century socialism, or state-controlled Chinese capitalism. All these disputes express different arrangements of development around capitalist, socialist, or hybrid varieties.

A good example of this type of dispute linking international cooperation and national development options is found in Ecuador. Although the Correa administration maintained a well-known initiative for an oil moratorium in the Amazonian Yasuní region, it later decided to
open oil drilling. Although the specifics of this situation are beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to highlight two aspects. The first relates to a putative failure in international cooperation as expected by the government: as the international community did not provide enough funds for compensation of the oil that would be not be extracted and exported, President Correa considered that the ‘the world has failed us’. The second relates to the need for legitimation of a decision that was in conflict with the environmental and progressivist rhetoric, but typical of a conventional development strategy seeking an increase in exports and rents. Among the arguments to support that decision was that the oil exports would be not directed to the USA but to China and other Asian countries. Its focus was not on the oil extraction and all its social and environmental risks and impacts, but in a discussion on state control over the resource, rent capture and destination of the exports.26

Type II disputes do not seem to be so common in the international arena. In the case of SSC, an interesting example was found in the early formulations of the ALBA initiative, promoted by Venezuela. That experiment included regional trade agreements quite different from conventional free trade formats, as these new arrangements were based on exchange as reciprocity, reciprocal access to Venezuelan oil blocks in the Orinoco area, or attempts to establish regional cooperation (ie property shared by different governments). An example in North–South cooperation was the insistence of several industrial countries on imposing a ‘green economy’ on the global South. In these cases, the debate moves beyond instrumental arrangements to deal with key factors like the state’s role, market regulation, or international trade insertion or integration. The important feature of these disputes is that they are all development alternatives (in the sense of Escobar),27 as they all share basic premises, such as growth and progress. In other words, they are different expressions of development within modernity.

Lastly, Type III disputes move beyond the core shared components of modern development, and express arguments between alternatives to any and all of its varieties. This posture implies a discussion resulting from efforts to deal with alternatives that are beyond the modern realm of all varieties of development.

**South American Buen Vivir as an alternative to development**

In South America Type III debates are being expressed in the discussions on different versions of development and the Buen Vivir concept. In its original meaning Buen Vivir emerged from a variety sources, invoking some indigenous sensitivities and concepts, particularly those of Andean origin, plus other critical reactions to modernity within the Western academy and social movements.28 Buen Vivir is also a plural field, but it shares a radical broad critique of all development varieties, and a preliminary set of alternatives at the margins of or beyond modernity. In this sense Buen Vivir is at the same time both post-capitalist and post-socialist.

The basis of Buen Vivir includes commitments on quality of life, not only material but also spiritual. Communities are defined in an expanded sense, which includes some non-human elements or even the whole environment. In some cases this ends in the concept of Pacha Mama (Mother Earth), as an all-encompassing social–ecological set. Duality between society and Nature is rejected, and the non-human are recognised as subjects (accepting intrinsic values, and as a consequence, the rights of nature). This means that, under Buen Vivir, pre-political settings are different, and non-humans may perform as political actors and engage in
politics, but politics is conceived in a different way. Furthermore, Buen Vivir does not accept the instrumentalisation or commodification of social life and nature.

Buen Vivir is a category delinked from the idea of a predetermined historical linearity, and so rejects the aims of progress and growth (it is not a Southern version of de-growth but, more strictly, actually an ‘a-growth’ posture). It acknowledges that there is a diversity of knowledges (and sensitivities and spiritualties), and affirms that Western modern knowledge has no superior status.

As there are varieties of development, there are a number of varieties of Buen Vivir. Examples are the Ecuadorian Kichwa-based sumak kawsay approach, the Aymara Bolivian suma qamaña, and those resulting from critical thought within Western traditions, like some biocentrism or ecological feminist postures. There are differences among each of them, but all share the same basis. This is a non-essentialist concept, as it depends on each ecological, historical and social context; thus it is not possible to have a single ‘manual’ on it, in contrast to the concept of ‘development’.

Therefore, the Buen Vivir critique of all development varieties expresses a Type III dispute. At the same time conservative, liberal and socialist critiques of Buen Vivir, quite common in South America, are also disputes of this kind.

Returning to the above example of oil drilling in Ecuadorian Amazonia, from a Buen Vivir perspective, there is no room for such projects that violate nature’s rights in the ecologically rich tropical forests, and also have impacts upon indigenous communities. So China’s mega-loans for oil extraction are not seen as a new alternative form of cooperation, but rather as a major social and environmental threat. In other words, Buen Vivir demands the protection of a social–natural network, the Pacha Mama, which seems incompatible with current development varieties displayed by governments.

A complementary effect of Type III disputes is that progressivist governments are fiercely trying to transform Buen Vivir into a new variety of development, so as to return to the field of Type II or Type I disputes. A noteworthy example of this today is found in Bolivia, with the recent general law on Mother Earth, which presents a new version of Buen Vivir attached to a variety of development, now labelled ‘integral development’.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the present governments of Bolivia and Ecuador do not have strong programmes for promoting Buen Vivir in other countries, at least among their neighbours in South America. Thus, alternatives to development are outside traditional cooperation, as these are ideas that require a critical examination of the very idea of development. At the same time, if the governments of Ecuador and Bolivia fully follow their constitutional mandates to pursue Buen Vivir, they should reject China’s (but also US, European, etc) cooperation, as it promotes development varieties that have intolerable social and environmental impacts.

**Opening the disputes on development and its alternatives in South–South cooperation**

The recognition of development varieties, and the new typology of the disputes on development alternatives, and alternatives to development, have several implications. Type III disputes are usually unrecognised by those deeply rooted in modern development perspectives. This is because they are confusing them with disputes of the first or second type, as they are unable to ‘understand’ a critique and alternative that is based in non-modern
discourses and practices. This is clear in the present controversies around Buen Vivir in Bolivia and Ecuador, where governments are trying to relocate this type under a new variety of development associated with the socialist tradition. This is a noteworthy paradox, as the political movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, which in the recent past supported and promoted the ideas of Buen Vivir, once in government, ended by trying to cut and weaken that alternative to development. In the case of Bolivia integral development was proposed as the new version, while Ecuador presented a ‘biosocialist republican’ variety. A similar condition is found among scholars who present Buen Vivir as an Andean version of Western welfare.

At the same time in Type III disputes conventional political settings are questioned. This happens when a development project is rejected by local communities because they consider that mountains are irritated or jaguars are angry. This is at odds with conventional political debates on development, because the non-human has neither political standing as an actor, nor rights. Promoters of conventional development varieties insist on translating these claims into their own ontology (eg ecological impacts, economic costs, local myths and beliefs, etc), neglecting the fact that they are dealing with a Type III dispute. In other words, these kinds of controversies are also an expression of ontological conflict.

Similarly in SSC ideas like Pacha Mama, social–natural communities as expressions of cultural minorities or legacies from ‘primitive’ indigenous or rural cultures are ignored. Following the Chinese development model of ‘climbing the mountain’ or the progressivist South American neo-developmentalism, these conceptions should be left behind as modernisation progresses. It is clear that SSC could be an instrument used by development to oblate any option beyond modernity.

In all these and similar cases, at least two processes operate at the same time: on one side, the obliteration of Type III disputes, with all its potential to explore alternatives beyond current modern development varieties, and, on the other side, the strengthening of the common base of ideas shared by all ‘development(s)’. Each new version of development is not really an advance towards a better variety, but a fixing of errors and impacts that reinforces and strengthens its core, making it more powerful. This is very clear in South America, where all governments have ended up pursuing extractivist strategies; certainly there are differences, but it is striking that all of them are following similar intensive uses and export of natural resources. These processes explain that diverse political regimes, ranging from China to Germany, from Venezuela to the USA, are all subject to the gravity of the central core of modern development.

There is, on the other hand, a citizen’s South–South cooperation, more reduced but very active in promoting Buen Vivir and other alternatives to development in Latin America. Examples of this are the Permanent Working Group on Alternatives of Development, supported by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, and the reshaping of some discussions on development in Mexico.

SSC channelled towards development ends by reducing the possibilities to open Type III disputes, while maintaining our time and energy in disputes II and I. As we are unable to discuss or pursue alternatives to development, the social and environmental conditions of the planet worsen. Different varieties of development all have negative effects, some worse than others, but all pushing resources to exhaustion, biodiversity to extinction, weakening cultural diversity and expanding commodification. There is an urgent need, on the contrary, to open and promote more Type III disputes to look for real alternatives to development. This means promoting a type of SSC detached from development goals and, paradoxically,
open to alternatives that are critical of development: a form of cooperation that moves beyond development.

A quite different form of international cooperation would be very valuable in this sense. In the case of Buen Vivir, a new cooperative effort would be valuable in promoting versions that provide new perspectives for different regions in South America, and promoting similar shifts beyond modern development in other continents. A first step in that direction is that international cooperation should recover its capacities to discuss the meanings, implications and sensitivities of development.

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**Notes on Contributor**

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**Notes**

2. Petkoff, “Las dos izquierdas.”
3. Ramírez Gallegos, “Mucho más que dos izquierdas.”
4. Sicu et al., “Por que novo-desenvolvimentismo?”; Féliz and López, Proyecto neodesarrollista en la Argentina; and García Linera, Socialismo comunitario del Vivir Bien.
6. Examples of analysis of this progressivist turn from a Northern academic perspective include Levitsky, and Roberts, The Resurgence of the Latin American Left; Philip and Panizza, The Triumph of Politics; and Grugel and Riggirozzi, “Post-neoliberalism in Latin America.” But most recent evaluations within South America are much more critical of issues like human rights, the institutional quality of democracy, economic policies, extractivism and environmental management. An example is the policy review for Ecuador, Cuvi, La restauración conservadora del correismo.
7. Gudynas, Extractivismos.
11. Named by some as the so-called Beijing Consensus. For a critical overview, see Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus.”
12. Lin, Demystifying the Chinese Economy.
15. In the sense of Blaser, “Ontological Conflicts,” who provides additional arguments on the so-called ontological turn and the limits of dealing with the concept of culture.
16. As described by Quijano, “Coloniality of Power.”
17. For an example of present debates on South American integration, see Martins, *Los retos de la integración y América del Sur*.
18. For example, by means of the Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES). See Gomes Saraiva, “Brazilian Foreign Policy towards South America” as an example of current debates on Brazil’s role.
24. WCED, *Our Common Future*.
25. See also Escobar, *Encountering Development*.
32. Group members are activists and academics from Latin America and Europe, activities include events like seminars and round tables in different countries, and an active publications programme. For more information, see [http://www.rosalux.org.es/ique-es-el-grupo-permanente-de-alternativas-al-desarrollo-128.html](http://www.rosalux.org.es/ique-es-el-grupo-permanente-de-alternativas-al-desarrollo-128.html).

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